I. Introduction
In March of 2010, Congress enacted and the President signed sweeping health-reform legislation. The effort by President Obama and Congressional Democrats to expand health insurance coverage to many of the 46 million uninsured people living in the United States involves provisions aimed at increasing the number of people receiving health insurance both through the government as well as through private insurance. In particular, much of the bill is aimed at increasing participation in the private, non-group health insurance market. The plan is neither the single-payer system advocated by the far left nor the deregulated, free-market approach advocated by the far right. As such, it has drawn energetic criticism from both sides.
Critics on the left have assailed the Health Reform's 4 individual mandate requiring people to purchase private insurance as well as the lack of a strong, public-option in the 1 http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/HealthCare/howard-dean-health-care-bill-bigger-bailoutinsurance/story?id=9349392. Such sentiments are not limited to the left. According to former House majority leader Dick Armey (R, Texas), "Only the most blinkered of partisans can look at the "individual mandate" and not see it as the answer to the health insurance industry's prayers." See http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2009/09/28/armey-individual-mandate-would-be-a-healthcare-industryboondoggle.html 2 Richard A. Epstein, "Harry Reid Turns Insurance Into a Public Utility," The Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704304504574610040924143158.html. 3 Montgomery, Lori. "Democrats push for compromise on health bill," The Washington Post, January 16, 2010: A04. 4 In the fall of 2009, the House and Senate each passed health reform bills. The bills were not identical, and, as such, any final bill would result from conference negotiations between the two houses. Throughout the paper, we use the term "Health Reform" to refer to the merged bill that would ultimately be passed. Although the actual health reform legislation is based on the Senate Bill with some changes negotiated with the House through the budget legislation. They argue that these measures, which come at a time of increasing premiums and record-high insurance-industry profits, amount to a bribe to the insurance industry. Critics on the right, on the other hand, have responded to the provisions of the bill requiring insurers to cover even those with expensive, pre-existing conditions at the same rates charged to healthy people without a strong enough mandate requiring everyone to purchase insurance by noting that, under these conditions, healthy people will rationally decline to purchase insurance unless or until they become sick. This, they argue, will make it impossible for private insurers to compete, especially with a publicly-subsidized plan, and quickly drive them out of business.
Both sides of the argument have some merit. Ultimately, whether Health Reform is expected to be, on net, positive or negative for insurance companies and other firms in the health sector, is an empirical one. Characterizing the sign and magnitude of this effect is the subject of this article.
To identify the impact of health reform on insurance company stocks, we exploit the surprise victory of Republican Scott Brown over Democrat Martha Coakley in the Massachusetts special election to replace the late Edward Kennedy (Democrat) in the Senate. Brown's victory, which was largely unanticipated until shortly before the election, represents a shock to the likelihood of Health Reform being enacted. Thus, if Brown's victory is associated with an abnormal, positive return to health care stocks, this suggests that the markets interpreted health reform harmful to the health insurance industry, and vice-versa in the case of a negative abnormal return.
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Using an event-study approach, we find that Brown's victory induced a positive and significant effect on the stocks of health care and pharmaceutical firms. 6 The average cumulative abnormal return between January 14 th and January 20 th was 1.2 percent for
Healthcare firms in the S&P 500 Index and 2.9 percent for the Index's Pharmaceuticals firms.
Concentrating on those firms in the Managed Care sub-industry (i.e., health insurers), we find a reconciliation process (and including an executive order clarifying the bill's position on federal funding of abortions), at the time we study there was still a good deal of uncertainty regarding how the final bill (if passed) would bridge the gap between the House and Senate versions. 5 We focus on the Brown election rather than the actual enactment of the bill because the election represented a significant shock to the likelihood of the bill's passage. In contrast, confidence in the bill's passage grew slowly but steadily in the weeks leading up to its enactment. Thus, it is likely that by the time the bill was actually signed, markets had already incorporated its impact into equity prices. 6 One exception is in the facilities (hospitals) sub-sector, where we fine a negative effect, most likely due to the fact that Health Reform was widely expected to increase hospital utilization.
positive abnormal return of 6.5 percent. 7 Thus, the market appears to have judged Health
Reform to be harmful to insurance and pharmaceutical interests.
The event study methodology used in this paper, first introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) , has been used for over forty years to study the behavior of stock market prices around events such as earnings announcements and changes in regulatory, tax, fiscal or monetary policy. 8 Although the majority of these studies have focused on "economic" events, a number have considered the impact of political events on equity prices. Knight (2006) (2008) show that the Jeffords switch was associated with negative returns for the oil and gas industries (which were favored under Republican policy) and positive abnormal returns for renewable energy stocks (which were favored under Democratic policy).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the timeline of the Massachusetts Special Election. Sections III presents the data and empirical strategy, and Section IV contains the results. Section V discusses robustness and Section VI concludes.
7 Other sub-industries show smaller positive returns with the exception of Health Care Facilities, where we find a cumulative abnormal return of -3.6 percent. This negative return is most likely due to expectations that Health Reform, by increasing insurance enrollment and public health insurance programs, would increase hospitalizations. 8 See MacKinlay (1997) and Binder (1998) for general surveys of the uses of these methods and Khotari and Warner (2006) for a more in-depth summary of the econometrics of event studies. 9 In addition to the results of the paper, Knight (2006) also provides an extensive review of the literature on event studies and political events.
II. The Massachusetts Special Election
In Brown and Coakley (which can be interpreted as an assessment of the market's belief about the probability of victory by either candidate). Due to the presence of a third candidate, Joseph
Kennedy (no relation to the deceased Senator), the numbers need not sum to 100. Through January 9, the victory probabilities stood steady at around 90% for Coakley and 10% for Brown.
Over the next week, the contracts moved around somewhat, inching toward 70/30 in favor of
Coakley at January 15 th close. Over the weekend, however, the contracts reversed, closing at 77
for Brown and 25 for Coakley on January 18 before Brown's eventual victory the next day.
Thus, much of the movement in expectations regarding the likelihood of a Brown victory occurred between the end of trading on January 15 and election day, during which time the markets were closed for the three day weekend. 20 In light of this, it does appear that Brown's victory came as a surprise to the markets and, as such, can be used to gauge the impact of the decline in the likelihood of health reform being passed on health care industry stocks.
III. Data, Empirical Strategy and Hypotheses
We analyze firms in the health care industry that were constituents of the S&P 500 on January 13, 2010. Each company is classified into its S&P Global Industry Classification 19 The Intrade.com contract on a Brown or Coakley victory paid $100 if the named candidate and $0 otherwise. Thus, the contract price (divided by 100) can be interpreted as the market's view of the likelihood of the named candidate winning the election. Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2008) suggest directly using the intrade.com prices as independent variables rather than the occurrence of a particular event. We do not adopt this here due to the fact that the Brown and Coakely markets were relatively thinly traded and, while a Brown victory would presumably move the market's assessment of the likelihood of Health Reform being enacted, it is not a direct measure of this assessment. Since the election represents a clean event, we instead adopt the simpler event-study methodlogy. 20 Corroborating the idea that Brown's victory came as a surprise, Howard Kurtz of the Washington Post details how the media were slow to pick up on the possibility that Brown might win. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/25/AR2010012500741.html Standard (GICS) using the S&P Net Advantage database. Returns are based on the Datastream total return index, used to account for dividend distributions.
We begin our analysis of the anticipated impact of Health Reform on the broad health care industry by estimating the impact of Scott Brown's election on all healthcare constituents of the S&P 500. 21 Then, in order to get a more detailed view of the election's impact, we classify the firms into each of the seven healthcare sub-industries contained in the S&P 500 based on the S&P Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) classification, namely: Health Care (HC)
Distributors, HC Equipment, HC Facilities, HC Services, HC Supplies, Managed HC, and
Pharmaceuticals. These seven sub-industry classifications allow for a more nuanced analysis as one would expect the Managed HC companies to react differently to Brown's election than HC facilities (Appendix Table 1 lists the companies in our analysis and their respective portfolios).
We employ the event study methodology as outlined by MacKinlay(1997) to estimate the change in return of these companies operating in the health industry as a result of the surprising election of Scott Brown. The method is, in principle, quite simple. We treat Brown's election as an exogenous shock to the likelihood of health reform being passed, and thus any abnormal returns to health care equities following the election can be attributed to the impact of the election. In practice, the identifying assumptions are that (i) the outcome of the election came as a surprise and so its impact was not incorporated into stock prices before the election took place,
(ii) that markets are efficient so that the market's reaction to the election captures the "true" impact of the election on the firms in question, and (iii) that no other events occurred during the event window that might affect firms' abnormal returns.
In order to allow for the fact that the likelihood of Brown's victory may have been incorporated into stock prices in the days before the election and/or may not have been fully incorporated on election day (since the polls did not close until after the market did), we consider an event window beginning two trading days before the election day and ending one day after it.
Thus the four trading days in the event window range from Thursday, January 14 th to
Wednesday, January 20 th (inclusive). Our choice of the start date of the event window is motivated (as per Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2008) ) by referring to the Intrade prediction market. As figure 1 shows, the odds of Scott Brown winning the elections started to increase dramatically on January 14, 2010. Although a case could be made for starting the event window slightly earlier, one of the managed care firms we study, Aetna, announced in its 8-K quarterly earnings filing on January 12 th that it expected lower earnings in 2010 than 2009.
Hence, we start our event window on January 14 th in order to allow markets to fully incorporate this news and avoid contaminating our study.
To address the question of whether there were other firm events that took place during the event window and might contaminate it, we reviewed the First Call Historical database, the NewsBank World News service, and Lexus/Nexus Academic for relevant news stories during the event period. Although some firms received idiosyncratic news during the event period, the news was not systematically good or bad, and such events there were (e.g., court rulings, recalls)
were rare and unlikely to have broad effects at the industry or sub-industry level. 22 The major exception is Aetna's "negative-surprise" earnings announcement on January 12 th discussed above, which could be interpreted as bad news for the industry in general and led us to choose January 14 th as the start of the estimation window.
We estimate normal returns using the following market model:
where it R is the daily arithmetic rate of return of firm (i) on day (t). As a broad measure of the market returns mt R , we use the daily rate of return of the S&P Total Market Index. 23 it ε is the error term for company (i) during period t , which we assume has the following characteristics:
The market model is estimated during the period starting one day before the start of the event window and extending back 1000 trading days. Using the market model's estimated parameters ), we extrapolate the expected normal return of the equities during the event window. The impact of Brown's election on healthcare companies is assessed using firms'
Abnormal Return (AR), which measures the difference between actual returns for these equities 22 Events affecting only a single firm are captured by the idiosyncratic shock to firms' abnormal returns and will not bias the estimates of the impact of the election. 23 We choose the S&P Total Market Index as our benchmark because it is a broad-based measure of equity markets. The results are essentially unchanged if the S&P Completion Index, which excludes firms in the S&P 500 (including the firms in our sample), the S&P 500, or the Wilshire 5000 is used as the benchmark for the market model. during the event window vis-à-vis their estimation period's predicted returns. Hence, the (AR) of company (i) on day (t) is equal to;
The Average Abnormal Return (AAR) of a specific portfolio on day (t) is the unweighted average of the abnormal returns of all N companies in that portfolio on day (t)
This study investigates the total impact of Brown's election during the event period, by measuring the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) for all firms within a portfolio throughout the duration of the event window, which starts on day t1 and ends on day t2:
AAR CAAR
Eq. (4) The significance of the abnormal returns is evaluated using four common parametric and non-parametric tests.
Method 1: The Parametric Traditional Test (Binder, 1998):
Under the null hypothesis that the event under investigation has no impact on the equities, the distribution of the Abnormal Returns is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance ) (
Eq. (5) It is assumed that the individual it AR 's are independent and identically distributed, and that the standard deviation of the companies' abnormal returns remains unchanged during the event window. That is, the event affects the mean only, and leaves other parameters unchanged. Hence,
) is estimated by calculating the standard deviation of the it AR of each company on the same day (t) and dividing by the square root of the number of companies (Binder 1998) . Under the assumption that the it AR 's are normally distributed, the estimated standard deviation of t AAR has a t-distribution:
The null hypothesis that 0 = t AAR is then tested using Z 1 : Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985) and Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988) T is t-distributed (Savickas, 2003) .
Method 3: The Nonparametric Generalized Sign Test (Cowan, 1992):
The first parametric test above assumes that the abnormal returns are identical, independent, and normally distributed across firms. Cowan's (1992) This statistic has normal distribution. The null hypothesis is that the proportion of positive cumulative abnormal returns in the event period is the same as the proportion of positive to negative returns during the estimation period.
Method 4: The Nonparametric Rank Test (Corrado, 1989):
Like the sign test, Corrado's nonparametric rank test does not require abnormal returns to be normally distributed to achieve proper specification under the null hypothesis, and "remains immune to misspecification under the null hypothesis" (Campbell and Wasley 1993, 88) . The test is constructed by ranking the abnormal returns for each exchange for each event. The rank of a particular day's return is uniformly distributed regardless of the distribution of the abnormal returns themselves. The Corrado rank test makes use of this fact in constructing test statistics.
The rank of exchange i's abnormal return for a certain event on day t is . The Corrado rank measure as used in Meznar, Nigh, and Kwok (1998) is constructed as:
Eq. (14) where N is the number of firms, L is the length of the event window, T 0 is the first day of the estimation period, and T 2 is the last day of the event window. The statistic converges to unit normal as the number of securities in the portfolio increases.
The statistical tests discussed above are meant to test for the presence of abnormal returns. Given the motivation of the paper, e.g., to assess whether equity markets support those who argue that Health Reform will help health care firms or those who argue it will harm them, we are agnostic as to the direction of the abnormal returns. Health reform is expected to have several effects. It will increase the number of people who have insurance, it will affect the average cost of those who have insurance, and it will increase regulation on firms' prices and plans. All else equal, adding customers should increase profit. However, if the new customers are unhealthy, this could lead profit to decrease. New regulations could prevent firms from increasing prices or force them into unprofitable lines of business.
The balance between these factors will differ from sub-industry to sub-industry.
However, there is one case where the impact of Health Reform is particularly clear. Hospitals are required to care for patients who present themselves at the Emergency Department, whether the patient can pay or not. As such, they are forced to care for patients who will not or cannot pay for the care they receive. This unpaid or "charity" care costs hospitals billions of dollars each year. Health Reform, by insuring many of these patients, is expected to significantly reduce hospitals' unpaid care (as well as increase utilization by those with insurance). As such, we expect the effect of Brown's election on health facilities (including hospitals) to be negative (corresponding to a positive impact of Health Reform on facility profits). Table 1 presents the results of the analysis for all the health care firms in the S&P 500 and decomposed into their sub-industries, pharmaceuticals, managed care (insurance), equipment, facilities, services, distributors and suppliers. Figure 2 plots the abnormal returns overall and for each segment over the four day event window.
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IV. Results
We begin by considering all health care firms in the S&P 500 in the rows labeled "All".
Columns (1-4) give the daily abnormal returns. The first row gives the estimated abnormal return for that day. The next two rows give the t-statistics for the AAR and SAR tests, respectively. Thus, overall, we see positive abnormal returns to healthcare firms on Day -2 (Thursday, January 14, 2010) and Day 0 (Tuesday, January 19, 2010) and insignificant abnormal returns on the other two days. Overall, there is a 1.2 percent abnormal return over the four day event window, significant at the one percent level for both the CAAR and SCAR tests. Using firm market values the day before the start of the event window, this estimate implies an increase in the firms' total market value of approximately $14.5 billion. Thus, Brown's election appears to have been beneficial for healthcare stocks as a whole. Although we are able to reject the null hypothesis of no effect using the non-parametric sign test, we are unable to reject using the rank test.
The remaining rows of the table decompose the effect by sub-industry. We begin with the sub-industries most discussed in the context of Health Reform: pharmaceuticals, managed care (insurers), and facilities (hospitals). For Pharmaceutical firms, we again find positive and significant effects. There are significantly positive abnormal returns on Days -2, 0 and +1. The cumulative abnormal return over the whole event window is 2.9 percent, significant at the 1 percent level by both the CAAR and SCAR tests. This corresponds to an increase in the total market value of pharmaceutical firms in our sample of approximately $20 billion. 25 Both of the non-parametric tests reject the null hypothesis of no effect.
The Managed Care sub-industry includes the major insurance companies (Aetna, CIGNA, Coventry Health Care, Humana, Unitedhealth Group, and WellPoint). The analysis shows positive and significant abnormal returns on days -2, -1 and 0. Overall, we find a 6.5 percent abnormal return, corresponding to an increase in the market value of these firms of approximately $6.7 billion, over the event window indicating that Brown's election and the subsequent decrease in the likelihood of passing Health Reform were interpreted as a good thing for the insurance industry. Thus, health reform appears to have been seen as harmful to insurance interests rather than a "dream scenario," at least as far as the markets are concerned.
The facilities sub-industry includes major hospital operators such as Community Health Systems, Lifepoint, Tenet and Universal Health Services. In contrast to the pharmaceuticals and managed care sub-industries, we find a significantly negative abnormal return for facilities associated with Brown's election. Although there is a small positive abnormal return on day -2, the other three days feature negative abnormal returns. Overall, we find a cumulative abnormal return of -3.6 percent during the event window, corresponding to a decrease of $730 million in the market value of these firms. This return is significantly different from zero according to both the CAAR and SCAR tests, although we are unable to reject the null of no effect using the rank tests. 26 As discussed above, the result that Health Reform is expected to benefit hospitals is not unexpected and results from the fact that increasing insurance rolls will significantly reduce the amount of uncompensated care that hospitals must provide.
The remainder of the table presents the results for the Equipment Services, Distributors, and Suppliers sub-industries. We find a small, positive effect for equipment, while the effects for services, distributors and suppliers are both small and statistically insignificant.
Before turning to robustness checks, a comment on interpreting the magnitude of the effects is in order. While we find an abnormal return of 1.2 percent associated with Brown's election, this is not the same as saying that Health Reform is expected to decrease the value of firms in our sample by 1.2 percent. This would only be an appropriate conclusion if the probability of reform were 1 before the election and 0 after. Otherwise, the estimate must be scaled by the change in the probability of reform. Thus, if the election decreased the probability of reform from 0.8 to 0.2, the appropriate back-of-the-envelope computation would be that reform was expected to decrease the value of the firms in our sample by 1.2/(0.8-0.2) = 2 percent. Since data on the likelihood of reform before and after the election is not available, we have focused on the effect of the election here instead of the impact of Health Reform per se.
These concerns do not, however, affect the interpretation of the signs of the effect. Thus, a positive abnormal return associated with the election corresponds to Health Reform being expected to harm firm interests as long as Brown's election decreases the probability of reform.
This assumption seems non-controversial.
V. Robustness
In this section, we briefly discuss several potential concerns with the analysis and show that the results are robust to addressing these factors.
V-1: Event Clustering and Cross-Sectional Correlation
The traditional event study methodology as described above is well-suited for situations where the firms in question are drawn from a variety of industries and the events that potentially 26 The Sign test looks at the ratio of positive to negative abnormal returns. Thus, for facilities which are experiencing negative returns, we are interested in (1-Sign test p_value) which is significant at the 10% level.
affect each firm do not coincide in calendar time. In such cases, cross-sectional correlation is not likely to be important, as is assumed in the standard tests.
We are interested in studying the effect of a single event, the Brown-Coakley election on firms in a single industry, health care. In this case, it is likely that the unobserved shocks to firm returns are correlated across firms. This will cause the covariances between the abnormal returns to differ from zero, in which case the standard methodology may not be appropriate. Bernard (1987) discusses such concerns arising from clustering.
The typical way in which the literature addresses clustering/correlation issues is through the portfolio method, following Jaffe (1974) . In this method, the securities in question are first aggregated into a portfolio, and then the portfolio is analyzed as a single security. Since the total value of the portfolio takes any correlation in firm returns into account, it implicitly addresses issues related to correlation in the returns. To implement the portfolio approach, we construct market-capitalization weighted portfolios for all health care firms in our sample and for firms in each of the eight sub-industries described above. 27 We conduct the event study analysis and the four parametric and non-parametric tests described above on each of these eight portfolios. Table 2 presents the results of the analysis for the healthcare market capitalization weighted portfolio. Figure 3 plots the cumulative abnormal returns for that portfolio overall and by sub-industry over the four day event window.
The findings of the portfolio analysis align quite closely with those of the standard approach. The values of the CAARs are 2.2 percent for the overall healthcare market portfolio, 2.8 percent for Pharmaceuticals portfolio, 6.0 percent for the Managed HC portfolio, and -5.8 percent for the Facilities portfolio. The direction of the market reaction for these portfolios is consistent with our findings above, negative for the facilities sub-sector, and positive for the others. The CAARs are significantly different from zero at the 1% level for the parametric tests for each of these portfolios except for facilities, which is significant at the 5% level. The nonparametric Rank and Sign tests, along with the dummy regression confirm the statistical significance of these results to varying degrees of significance. The CAARs for all the above sectors except Facilities are significant at the 5% level for the Rank test, 10% level for the Sign test, and the 1% level for the dummy regression. The CAAR for facilities is significant at the 10% level for the Rank and Sign tests and the 5% level for the dummy regression. The significance of the CAARs for these portfolios is consistent with our findings above. The
CAARs for the Equipment, Services, Distributors, and Suppliers portfolios are not statistically significant.
V-2: Heteroskedasticity
Although the standardized tests described above address any heteroskedasticity in returns, an alternative approach to addressing potential heteroskedastcity uses a dummy variable regression with robust standard errors to evaluate the impact of Brown's election on each of the eight market-value-weighted portfolios. 28 Let
( be the return on portfolio (i) at time t, and let mt R be the return on the market portfolio at time t. Let t D be a dummy variable that equals one if t is one of the dates in the event window, and 0 otherwise. We estimate the equation:
The coefficient ) (i p δ is then the average abnormal return for the portfolio (i) during the event.
The results of the dummy-variables regressions are presented in column (8) of Table 2 and are virtually identical to those of the standard approach. Column (9) of Table 2 
V-3: Small Number of Firms
The Rank test has been documented to be "consistently the best-specified and most powerful test statistic across numerous event conditions" (Campbell and Wasley 1993, 75) .
However, this test requires a sufficiently large number of securities in the portfolio to converge to unit normal. Since we investigate the impact of Brown's election on a single portfolio rather than multiple firms to address event clustering and cross-sectional correlation in section v-1 as per Jaffe (1974) , we develop a new test to evaluate the significance of the cumulative impact during the event period. This new approach is inspired by the rank test but is well specified for small sample size.
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Analogous to Corrado's Rank test, the test is constructed by first converting portfolio (p)'s excess returns to their respective ranks. That is, the difference between the actual returns of portfolio (p) and those predicted by the market model, are ordered from the smallest to the largest over the period starting with the first day of the estimation window and ending with the last day of the estimation window. Then the ranks during the event window are aggregated to construct _ :
_ where T 1 and T 2 are the first and last days of the event window, respectively and is the rank of the portfolio's excess return on day t of the event window. The event window's excess returns are converted to their respective ranks based on the ranks of identical excess returns in the estimation window. 30 Since the rank of the abnormal return each day is independently and uniformly distributed between 1 and T 0 , _ is the sum of L independent and identically distributed uniform random variables. We then test the null hypothesis of no excess abnormal return during the event period by comparing the realized value of _ to the distribution under the null hypothesis. Abnormally large (resp. small) values of _ indicate a positive (resp. negative) abnormal return associated with the event.
31
The results of this modified test are presented in column (10) of table 2. These results reinforce the findings of Corrado's original Rank test. The results for the overall healthcare portfolio, in addition to the pharmaceutical, managed healthcare, and facilities are all significant 29 Indeed, Corrado (1989) suggests but does not investigate a similar test statistic for the case of a small number of firms and single-day events. Our test is also similar to the SQ test proposed by Gelbach, Helland and Klick, again extended to the case of multi-day events. 30 If the abnormal return on an event day t falls between the abnormal returns ranked k and k+1, we let k pt = k+0.5. The results are essentially unchanged if we use a linear interpolation to compute k pt or adopt the conservative assumption that k pt = k or k pt = k+1, depending on whether the data favors rejecting the null due to unusually high or low values of D P_Rank . 31 In our case, L=4 and the distribution of the sum of four independent variables distributed uniformly and discretely on 1 to 1000 can be directly computed. For the case of larger L, the distribution can be computed using formulas for the sum of continuous uniform variables. at least at the 5% level. 32 The results for the Equipment, Services, Distributors, and Suppliers portfolios are not statistically significant.
VI: Individual Firm Analysis for Managed Care
The focus of the Health Reform has been on reforming insurance markets, and in particular in reforming insurance markets for individuals in order to reduce the number of uninsured people in the United States. Due to the importance of the insurance industry for both the political debate and real impact of Health Reform, in this section we investigate the firms in the managed care segment in more detail.
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The firms in this segment are Aetna, CIGNA, Coventry Health Care, Humana, Unitedhealth and WellPoint. In order to focus on managed HC, we conduct the event study with the four parametric and non-parametric tests and the dummy regression approach individually on each of the six managed HC (insurers) companies that are members of the S&P500. The firmlevel analysis also helps put to rest any remaining concerns regarding cross-sectional correlation within this industry segment. Table 3 presents the analysis results for the individual health insurance firms. Figure 4 plots the CAARs for these individual firms over the four day event window. 
VII. Conclusion
The results of the event study in this paper show a strong link between Scott Brown's victory and positive abnormal returns for firms in the health care sector, and in the health insurance and pharmaceutical sub-sectors in particular. Given that Brown campaigned explicitly to defeat Health Reform, by virtue of being the 41 st Republican vote, had the power to do so, we have interpreted the evidence as saying that markets expected the reform effort to be harmful to insurers.
While this interpretation is natural, Scott Brown's election did more to the Congressional landscape than merely defeat health reform. Thus, it raises the possibility that the abnormal returns we detected were not a result of Brown's opposition to health reform, but to some other contemporaneous change. For example, even if Brown did not explicitly oppose health reform, he would still represent the 41 st Republican vote, which would increase the Republicans' bargaining power across the board. Brown described his own economic philosophy saying "I am a free enterprise advocate who believes that lower taxes can encourage economic growth."
34
Either the general movement toward a more Republican approach to business or a movement toward Brown's own stated economic philosophy could be interpreted as pro-business and thus lead equity prices to rise. However, while this might lead all stocks to rise (indeed, the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 116 points on election day), it would not account for the abnormal returns experienced by health stocks.
A more subtle version of this critique is to note that, not only did Brown's election deal a severe blow to Health Reform, it also might have signaled that additional regulations aimed at the health care sector would become less likely in the future. Since the health sector is regulated more intensively than typical industries, this could result in an abnormal, positive return to health care stocks. Thus the abnormal returns we detected using the event study would contain the effects of provisions explicitly in Health Reform as well as other reforms that might be coming 34 http://www.brownforussenate.com/issues further down the line. Although our analysis is unable to separately indentify these effects, it seems unlikely that the Health Reform was believed to be a good thing for insurers but the effect on anticipated future regulations was so strong as to overwhelm this effect and generate a positive abnormal return following Brown's election. Further, if we interpret the Health Reform as containing not only the original legislation but also the additional regulations that would follow from it in the future, then both of these types of effects would be included in the broader definition of health reform.
Rather than test a hypothesis about the impact of an election or policy change on equities, this paper uses the efficiency of markets and the impact of Brown's surprise victory to judge which of the competing claims regarding the impact of health reform on the insurance industry, and on the health care industry more broadly, is supported by the market. If markets efficiently incorporate information on expectations about future performance, the results suggest that the markets side with Republicans, and that Health Reform was expected to harm the insurance industry. However, it should be pointed out that the positive abnormal returns associated with Brown's election do not necessarily invalidate the claims from the left that the bills were too generous to insurance companies, since it is likely that the two sides were referring to different counterfactuals in their statements. In particular, many liberal activists believe strongly that the right health care system is a single payer system such as the Canadian system or else a "Medicare-for-all" type system. Relative to this benchmark, the current bills were certainly more generous to insurance companies than a single-payer system was likely to be. 
